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Hashish traffickers, hashish consumers, and colonial knowledge in Mandatory Palestine

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The year is 1948, and the place is Al-Raml prison in Beirut. Convict Hanna al-Salman awaits his verdict, execution by hanging, for the killing of two prostitutes. Hanna listens attentively to stories disclosed to him by Ahmad and Munir, his two cellmates. He is fascinated by their tales about the exploits of a certain Sami al-Khoury, ‘one of the most dangerous smugglers in the world of drugs’, aka ‘the boss’. The following cabbage (malfuf) story, which illustrated the boss’s ingenuity and his ‘amazing ability to escape police networks that pursued him’, impressed Hanna the most and stirred up his emotions:

[The boss] instructed us [i.e. Munir and Ahmad] to sow cabbage. We thought he lost his mind. He said: obtain a plot of land and sow cabbage…. We said ya Ra'is, we came here to eat bread, not to farm. He said: sow cabbage and the rest is on me. So we sowed…. We kept on watering the cabbage, looking around and not understanding. Naturally, we didn’t do the sowing. We employed laborers from the region [to do that]. We… [were instructed] to see to it that the cabbage would open. One moonless night the boss arrived with ten young men equipped with Magnum revolvers and ten trucks loaded with hashish. We took the hashish and planted it inside the open cabbages. We worked all night. The Ra'is, Sami, insisted on rolling up his sleeves…. He would plant hashish inside the cabbage as though he were a physician giving medicine to a patient…. After ten days, which lasted like a hundred years, the cabbage leaves had shut, covering the hashish and swallowing it up. I swear to Allah. After that we collected [the cabbage] and sent it to Egypt in cargo planes, under the pretense of a cabbage export deal…. The way the cabbage was shut.…. An incredible thing.

Such stories about Sami al-Khoury not only astonished Hanna, they illuminated his own pitiful existence and convinced him that ‘he had wasted his life in vain’. Yet, a few days before his execution Hanna’s fate took an abrupt turn as another man confessed to the murder of the two prostitutes. Released from prison, Hanna hurries to enter ‘the enticing world which Sami al-Khoury had opened up for him by means of the malfuf secret’, becoming a hashish smuggler by profession and a way of life. In later years, Hanna would look back at his past with satisfaction, admitting that ‘his life actually began in prison’.

The stories about Hanna and the subterfuges of Lebanese hashish smugglers are transmitted in the 1994 novella Majma' al-Asrar (‘Bundle of Secrets’) by the celebrated Lebanese novelist, playwright and critic Elias Khoury. The novella is first and foremost a work of fiction. However, the account it gives of the boss’s smuggling escapades echoes a
credible historical reality, indicating the extent to which the Mandate period in the Levant was a bonanza for a great many Lebanese (and Syrian) hashish smugglers.

Ironically, the Levant emerged as a smugglers’ heaven owing to the inauguration of anti-cannabis regimes in the region and not the other way around. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Greece was the main source of hashish for Egypt. However, as the Greek Government heeded mounting British pressures to clamp down on local cannabis cultivators and smugglers, Egyptians turned to Syrian and Lebanese-grown cannabis to compensate for the loss of Greek supplies. As the British and the French gradually took control of the post-Ottoman Levant, Palestine thus became a ‘transit route’ in the illegal drug trade which unfolded between Lebanon-Syria in the north and Egypt in the south — that is, between the region’s greatest hashish exporter and the region’s greatest hashish importer, respectively. From then on, virtually all Egypt-bound hashish supplies from Lebanon-Syria had to cross through Mandatory Palestine, whether by land, by sea or by air. Arguably, this circumstance provided Lebanese cannabis cultivators and a plethora of local, regional and international hashish traffickers with unparalleled opportunities to reap profits.

At the same time, increased international efforts by the League of Nations to restrict, regulate or ban the flow and use of hashish, which coincided with the formation of the Mandates system in the Levant, were harmful to these very people whose livelihood depended on free movement of various commodities, including mind-altering substances. A sign of the League’s readiness to combat the proliferation of drugs, in 1921, it set up an Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and other Dangerous Drugs which coordinated international drugs information and recorded instances of smuggling; and in 1925, hashish (or Cannabis Indica) was added to the League’s International Opium Convention list of dangerous drugs. The convention, which went into effect in 1928, outlawed the exportation of hashish to countries — such as Palestine and Egypt — that had formerly prohibited its use, criminalizing traders in psychoactive substances and turning them into illicit ‘drug traffickers’.

Moreover, as people who had regularly crossed territories in relative ease, the creation of the Mandate states in the Levant, with customs and police outposts erected along these states’ borders, restricted their free movement, and they could no longer expect their (now illicit) cargo to go undetected. These inauspicious circumstances required them to come up with a variety of ploys and deceptions (of the malfuf type) to transport their psychoactive cargoes and have them cross safely from Lebanon, via Palestine, to Egypt.

In what follows, I examine the extent to which the rise in the early 1900s of international campaigns against cannabis, and the new racial and cultural meanings attributed to this mind-altering substance, impacted the lives of those people in Mandatory Palestine whose livelihood and leisure culture depended on the free movement of, and access to, this commodity. In view of the fact that the Mandatory period was a crucial phase in the global fight against cannabis, it serves as an excellent arena for exploring the local reverberations triggered by the reversal of the course of ‘the psychoactive revolution’, a revolution that has made drugs pervasive in human societies throughout modernity’s transatlantic history, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.

Indeed, in nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, psychoactive substances of various kinds were common in the daily lives of many people. Not unlike many European leaders and statesmen of their time, Ottoman sultans indulged in the pleasures of opium, and
members of Sufi orders, too, consumed opium and hashish in rituals and in other occasions. Consumption of these substances was not restricted to the upper echelons of the Ottoman state, however, as ordinary people, or the ‘lower classes’, were also reported to having spent time in coffeehouses consuming large quantities of opium and sometimes hashish. Mind-altering substances also served a wide range of medicinal purposes and they could be procured at any shop or street vendor, especially from herbalists (attar). Significantly, the same state of affairs prevailed in Iran under Safavid and Qajar rule, and in early modern Europe, where, as Piero Camporesi provocatively suggested, ‘from infancy to old age narcosis ruled supreme’. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman state, with an eye, among other things, to appeasing European critics of alleged Ottoman uncivility and immorality, carried out legal reforms to control and regulate the flow and use of certain intoxicants. However, as old habits die hard, these measures fell short of enforcing a complete ban on these substances. The Italian princess Cristina Trivulzio Di Belgiojoso, who was exiled to the Ottoman Empire in the years 1850–55, and had kept detailed travelogues about her encounters there, provides a vivid testimony of the open nature of hashish use in the Ottoman Levant: The use of this narcotic is widespread in Syria. If you meet a man whose eyes are dull and unsteady, whose face is lean, lips pale and thin, be assured that you are facing a hashish eater or drinker. If you see two such men facing each other at the table of a café, blowing clouds of smoke at each other without saying a word you can be sure that those two types are in the middle of a hashish orgy. If anyone offers you some sweets or some sherbet be careful: there may be hashish hidden in it.

It was against this backdrop that the Levant fell under the purview of the international community’s battle against mind-altering substances, now strictly defined as ‘drugs’. The effects of these developments on the world of hashish traffickers and hashish consumers in Mandatory Palestine are the subject of this study. I begin by examining how hashish traffickers readjusted to these unfavorable conditions of control and prohibition, and how their persistence in keeping up the hashish trade presented the authorities with unforeseen challenges. I then move on to provide a vista into Mandatory Palestine’s consuming subjects and the kinds of colonial knowledge about cannabis which helped to raise critical, racial and cultural, awareness of these subjects and to make sense of them.

The history of cannabis in Palestine has not been told before. With the exception of one valuable study by Cyrus Schayegh, which examines narcotics trafficking in the inter-war Levant and deals with Palestine only partially, no such study has been undertaken. Although we know quite a lot about the history of hashish and hashish-consuming peoples in other parts of the British Empire, and most notably India and Egypt, we know very little about their history in Mandatory Palestine. By drawing on previously untapped archival, press and literary sources from multiple locations, I hope to shed light on Palestine’s (under)world of hashish smugglers and hashish consumers, and the kinds of discourses that developed around them.

Although drug abuse in general was not a major issue in Palestine — the British repeatedly claimed that ‘Palestine herself has no dope problem’, and has ‘only a very limited market for narcotic drugs of any kind’ — the activities of hashish traffickers across its territory, from its northern to its southern limits, was cause of much alarm for the Mandatory
authorities. Claude Scudamore Jarvis, a British major who served in the English army in Egypt and Palestine, conveyed this sentiment most succinctly. Complaining about the menace of hashish traffickers he mused: ‘Stopping hashish smuggling is rather like an attempt to dam a stream with a clay barrier — directly you have plugged up one hole the water comes through in another place’. Jarvis was not alone in expressing frustration with the emergence of Palestine as a transit route in the region’s hashish trade. In 1936, Joseph Broadhurst, a former senior officer at the Palestine Police, also recalled with exasperation the ‘immensity of the smuggling problem that faced the Palestine Police’, and the so-numerous ‘smugglers of originality’ who, by virtue of having been ‘born with great natural cunning’, had ‘played so many tricks on the Police’ and ‘gave us endless trouble’. Broadhurst went on to say: ‘By every manner of trick hashish is smuggled over the Syrian-Palestinian frontier, through Palestine, across the burning Sinai Desert, over a lonely part of the Suez Canal and up to Cairo’.

20 Before examining in more detail the nature and repercussions of these smuggling operations, I would like to draw attention to the human actors who had carried them out. First and foremost, hashish traffickers in and across Palestine were ‘ordinary’ Palestinian Arabs — shopkeepers, peddlers, taxi drivers, garage owners, mechanics, tradesmen and peasants — or otherwise Arabs of neighboring countries such as Egypt, Lebanon-Syria and even Iraq. Sir Thomas Wentworth Russell (aka Russell Pasha), the legendary head of the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau, which the Egyptian Government set up in 1929, described this group as ‘a low class crowd with little toughness or discipline among them’; and according to another contemporary observer, these smugglers ‘had no masters in the world… [T]hey feared neither God nor man and would do anything for a few piasters’.  

21 Next on the list of hashish traffickers across Palestine were those termed ‘international gangs’, which included criminals from many countries around the globe (Egypt, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria, to mention but a few). Members of this group were equally an unpleasant folk. Henry De Monfreid, an early twentieth-century French adventurer and a smuggler of hashish en route from Greece to Egypt, provides an amusing description of the manners of one such international gang member, a Greek national:

He washed down his salad with great gulps of black wine out of a skin, and when he saw me coming he wiped his mouth with the back of his hand. He glowered sullenly, stuck his pipe insolently in his mouth, and sent forth a jet of saliva which nearly fell on my feet, just to show me how welcome I was.

22 Last, British military personnel stationed in Palestine and Egypt, who, as one contemporary local observer pointed out, ‘have been tempted by promises of big rewards or directly by high profits’, also took an increasingly active role in hashish smuggling operations to and from Palestine.

23 As noted, passport controls and customs checkpoints along borders, as well as police activities within and across the Mandatory states, these and other novel barriers called for equally creative solutions by our hashish traffickers. Ploys and deception were therefore an indispensable part of their craft. Cyrus Schayegh provides a revealing glimpse into the kind of subterfuge resorted to by hashish smugglers in Lebanon in order to transport their illicit cargo safely to Lebanon’s southern border, and from there to Palestine: ‘On the Beirut-Naqura-Haifa highway, professional smugglers tried to outsmart Gendarmerie patrols...
by using fake identity cards, hiding cars beside the road, driving off-road at points, deliberately turning off their lights at night, or using secondary roads; in Naqura, smugglers hid narcotics in often ingenious ways.\textsuperscript{28}

Such ‘tricks of the trade’, as Russell Pasha would call these ploys,\textsuperscript{29} can also be gleaned from smuggling operations across Mandatory Palestine, from North to South. For instance, a British police officer stationed in Palestine called attention to those smugglers who carried the drug in shoes with thick hollow soles and heels; in hollow slabs of chocolate labelled as the brand of a well-known firm; in a bundle of small hollowed crucifixes in the baggage of a bogus Greek monk; in thin bags tied to the thighs of a man beneath his clothes; in the turn-ups of six pairs of trousers packed in the trunk of a Bulgarian.\textsuperscript{30}

In these ploys and deceptions, hashish smugglers took advantage of, and were empowered by, what historian Paul Knepper described in the context of criminal activity in Europe as ‘world-shrinking technologies’, products of the long nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, my sources are clear on one point: our smugglers used cars, ships, trains and even airplanes, alongside more traditional transportation means (like camels),\textsuperscript{32} to ferry their illicit merchandise across borders. This posed great challenges to local, colonial and international law enforcement agencies, not only because of the intensity and volume of these smuggling operations, but also — perhaps mainly — because these operations brought to light the porous and perforated nature of the Mandate states’ borders.

Trains were most prominent in smugglers’ employment of modern transport technologies. An illustrative case is a 1929 controversy, apparently embarrassing to the British authorities, involving no other than the British High Commissioner to Egypt, Sir George Ambrose Lloyd. During a stopover at al-Ludd, Palestine, a search was conducted on a train carrying the dignitary back to Cairo from a visit to Damascus. Twenty-four slabs of hashish were found in his train car, the suspected culprits being the accompanying ‘Egyptian guards and servants’.\textsuperscript{33}

Automobiles were also instrumental in these smugglers’ endeavor to outsmart enforcement agencies. My sources provide frequent references to seizures of opium and hashish hidden in various parts of cars.\textsuperscript{34} The more daring and ingenious traffickers employed a combination of ‘world shrinking technologies’ simultaneously. Hence, a ‘member of a well-known Jaffa family’ who had ‘ordered a special railway van’ to ship his car to Qantara, the northeastern Egyptian city on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, was arrested following a discovery of ‘a great treasure of hashish and opium’ hidden in the car’s wheels.\textsuperscript{35}

Equally illuminating is a story about a gang of Jerusalemite hashish smugglers who had ‘brought suspicion on itself’ because for several months it had been buying up ‘every battered third or fourth-hand car, which nobody but an Oriental could possibly want to make use of’, shipping them by sea from Jaffa to Egypt. A search conducted in these cars confirmed the suspicion: the cars’ tires were ‘packed with hashish’.\textsuperscript{36}

International gangs took a leading role in the employment of multiple means of transportation in their smuggling operations. In 1937, for example, one such gang, comprising of Palestinians, Greeks, Egyptians and Italians, carried the illicit cargo all the way from Lebanon (where they procured the drug), via Palestine, to Port Said in north east Egypt, by using interchangeably cars, a train and an airplane (which was piloted by an Italian gang member). Unfortunately, for the gang, the ploy failed thanks to the alertness of undercover agents of the Narcotics Intelligence Bureau under the command of Russell Pasha.\textsuperscript{37}
Hashish arrived in Egypt, via Palestine, by car, by train, by plane, but also by sea. Indeed, aware of the fact that ‘certain ship crews were notorious smugglers’, the British in Palestine were not at all indifferent to ships sailing to Palestine’s ports and from there to Egypt, particularly Alexandria, the chief port of entry of illicit drugs. It comes as no surprise, then, that the Palestine Port Police, whose duty it was to intercept smugglers at sea, has had at its own share of troubles with cunning hashish smugglers. Joining the Palestine Police Force in 1922, and serving (until 1926) as a member of the Palestine Port Police, Douglas Duff provides telling recollections of these smugglers’ menace. He describes one case in which a schooner under his command pursued a vessel suspected of carrying a cargo of hashish from Sidon, Lebanon, only to realize all too late that ‘whilst we were chasing her they ran their cargo in another vessel and got it safely away’. Elsewhere, Duff complains about the poor quality of the equipment given to them to combat smugglers at sea. Attempting to start a schooner engine so as to chase a smugglers’ vessel, ‘not a sound came down the night-breeze’, and the smugglers vessel was able to disappear into the darkness. This episode, as Duff concludes, got him ‘mad with ourselves and the Government for the useless tools they gave us to discharge our duties’.

As mentioned, hashish trafficking also had a corrupting effect on British military personnel. Press reports about such errant British servicemen stationed in Palestine are too many to recount. One major case is the ‘Juke Box’ entertainment road show, which was performed in many camps in Palestine, in whose overturned vehicle north of Gaza were discovered more than 300 kilos of hashish (and a little less than 250 kilos of opium). This case not only caused a public uproar of sorts but also led the British authorities to opine that they ‘are on the trail of one of the biggest drug rings in the Middle East whose activities are spread into Syria and the Lebanon and possibly as far as Turkey, as well as Egypt and Palestine’.

Jews, either native-born but especially newly arrived immigrants, members of the ‘new yishuv’, were usually absent from hashish smuggling activities, and perhaps kept away from this substance altogether (I will explore the reasons for this avoidance in the next section). That is not to say, however, that some of them were not overly impressed with smuggling operations of the types described above and the great profit they were likely to procure from them. It has been suggested that Zionist organizations that had fought the British in Palestine may have been involved in drug trafficking operations to fund their covert armed activities. I can now say with certainty that at least one such organization – the Haganah – has contemplated resorting to such activity as a means of reinvigorating its scanty resources, taking hashish smuggling operations across Palestine as an appropriate example.

This clearly comes through a testimony given in 1970 by Shimshon Mashbetz, a founding member of the intelligence arm of the Haganah (Shai). Mashbetz describes in detail how the idea initially came up. He recalls an evening at a local café in Haifa, in 1942 or 1943, where he and his associates discussed the organization’s ‘dwindling resources’ and possible ways of boosting them. Mashbetz credits his comrade Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon for suggesting hashish trafficking as an appropriate solution. The plan, as Palmon reportedly suggested, was ‘to smuggle hashish from Lebanon to Egypt and, when selling it, procuring a tenfold increase [in price]’. David Shaltiel, who was district commander of the Haganah in Jerusalem during the 1948 war, was particularly enthusiastic about the idea: ‘His eyes began to shine through his spectacles… and he uttered at once, “let’s do it” (qadimah)’. The group
received approval for conducting an initial inquiry into the issue and Mashbetz was entrusted with this mission; ‘if it was possible [for us] to transfer arms to secret hiding places [sliqim],’ he tells his interviewer three decades later, ‘we could also transfer hashish.’

Mashbetz then relates how he made use of his Lebanese connections in order to travel to Lebanon to review the hashish market there. In Beirut, he meets ‘a quintessential Middle East smuggler’ who provided him with an automobile and a driver: ‘[We] drove through Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, [through] hashish plantations and opium plantations…. I studied the whole issue — how to cultivate [cannabis], how to market [it], the [different cannabis] brands, what’s good and what’s bad, and how to tell the difference between the two’.47

Returning to Haifa with the necessary information, Mashbetz briefs the Haganah leadership on his journey. All present, he says with an evident self-congratulatory tinge, were ‘enthralled’ by his presentation. Hence, a plan had been drawn to smuggle hashish from Lebanon to Egypt, via Palestine, to Egypt. Alas, Shaul (Meirov) Avigur, who was an instrumental figure in forming Shai, strongly objected to the idea altogether: ‘He listened to [my] story quietly and, lowering his head, announced conclusively in a quiet and confident tone, but in a manner that made it impossible for us to disagree, “impure money shall not [be permitted to] desecrate the purity of our arms”’. Clearly, after these words, as Mashbetz concluded ruefully, ‘the whole plan was shelved and we forgot about the issue’.48

The Haganah may, or may not, have been engaged in hashish smuggling operations, but other, perhaps the more unruly and adventurous elements within the Zionist camp and its British sympathizers, have made it their occasional business to raid hashish smuggling operations across Palestine in order to confiscate the profitable psychoactive cargo. It is related, for instance, that when ‘lacking a penny for fixing a campfire’, Skipper Aryeh Bayevski, a pioneer of ‘Jewish shipping’ in Palestine, would, together with a friend, Isaac, ‘embark upon the adventures of “pirates”’:

The two would… take to sea in a tiny sailing boat and await the arrival of Arab smugglers who transported ‘hashish’ from Lebanon or Syria to the Land of Israel. The ‘bandits’ would intercept smugglers ships, quickly landing on their decks armed with hatchets and knives. Isaac, who was fluent in Arabic, would demand — and receive — from the Arab skipper[s] a modest ransom (ma’ot) [in the form] of hashish [in return for allowing the ship to proceed intact]. Bayevski and Isaac would then return to shore with the booty at hand and spend the entire money on wild campfire drinking…. This adventure in the dead of night was indeed very dangerous, but Bayevski would not be deterred by anything.49

Finally, illegal hashish trafficking across Mandatory Palestine cannot be separated from criminal activity that surged elsewhere in the world during the interwar years. In fact, it may have been a local manifestation of the growing audacity and sophistication of criminal activity on a global scale. It is no accident, therefore, that many individuals and groups in Europe at the time began to warn against a new breed of criminals who turned emerging political, economic and social structures to their advantage; ‘they used technology for deceitful financial transactions, to escape across national borders, and to maintain a wide-scale trade in illegal merchandise’.50 Hence, in Europe, as in Palestine, the challenges posed by border-crossing criminals provided yet another example of what Eric Hobsbawm described as ‘the utter impracticability of the Wilsonian principle to make state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of nationality and language’.51 Heightened concerns about the
growing power and expansion of global crime may explain, in part, why the League of Nations began as an institution for promoting peace among its member nations, but gradually shifted its original focus to crime prevention.

Hashish smuggling across Mandatory Palestine is only one part of the story I wish to tell here. A complementary part is local hashish consumers and the particular (colonial) knowledge that informed the formation of attitudes towards them. Hence, my overall objective in this section is to examine how the issue of Palestine’s consuming subjects was perceived and the discourses that developed around it. In particular, I try to understand how and why cannabis in Mandatory Palestine came to be loaded with cultural, political, ethnic and racial meanings that have, and never have had, anything to do with the substance itself, and certainly not with its actual psychoactive effects.

It was primarily through their colonial enterprises that Europeans first discovered the intoxicating effects of cannabis. Even though they were highly familiar with cannabis (or hemp) as a valuable source for the industrial production of cordage, it was largely in ‘Oriental’ colonial settings (such as India and Egypt), that they have made their first encounters with cannabis-oriented cultures, that is, with indigenous peoples who consumed (ate or smoked) hashish in their everyday lives. They consumed hashish for various reasons — medicinal, religious, pleasure-seeking, etc. — which all converged on one imperative: the will to get high.

Much like smell, hygiene and clothing, which lack biological attributes, so did cannabis take on considerable importance in the colonial racialization of many groups. Cannabis assisted in the exclusion of various hashish consuming populations fixing them at an inferior status and providing yet another reason — one of many — for hating and fearing them. It is no accident that the very groups who were the victims of this kind of ‘racism without race’ were almost invariably the groups that have borne the brunt, rather, of ‘racism with race’.

As this racialized knowledge was received in various European metropoles (and beyond them), it soon came to provide materials for the construction of such bourgeois values as temperance, discipline, rationality and productivity. As historian Richard Davenport-Hines opines, ‘habitual users of [drugs] seldom fit into the bourgeois sense of human identity as a serious business, stable, abiding and continuous, requiring the assertion of one true cohesive inner self as proof of health and good citizenry’. Contrasting hashish-consuming peoples with these values was made all the more easy (and all the more popular) by means of Orientalist tales that spoke of the transgressions and mayhem committed by these people, past and present. Chief among these tales was the myth of the mediaeval Assassins (or hashashin) — the Ismailli-Nizari sect whose members were said to have carried out suicide attacks against their Muslim enemies while under the influence of hashish — a myth that fascinated and engaged respectable Parisian bourgeoisie in the mid-nineteenth century. Interestingly, such European tales about hashish-induced Oriental corruption and savagery later provided authoritative support for colonial psychiatric knowledge that linked hashish consumption to insanity.

Given the above said, my underlying argument in this section is this: colonial knowledge about cannabis, once arriving in the shores of Mandatory Palestine, was applied as a distinguishing marker between Jews and Arabs (not unlike the ways in which marijuana in early twentieth-century US, was capitalized by the white middle classes in order to criminalize and marginalize blacks and Mexicans). But before I inquire into this issue at length, I should briefly comment on the identity of Mandatory Palestine’s hashish consumers.
The main consumers of hashish in Mandatory Palestine were local Palestinians and Arabs from neighboring countries. Take, for example, the city of Haifa in the 1930s, which attracted visitors and/or emigrants from the Arab states due to its importance as a maritime-territorial hub for many products, including hashish:

[The habit] of smoking drugs in Haifa has been established in the tin shacks of the eastern parts of the city. The majority of residents there are Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Hourani, and a few fellahs from the Land of Israel. Each week the police grab hold of Arabs for possessing… hashish, sometimes in little quantities, which testify to ‘self-use’, and sometimes in large quantities which are intended for [other] smokers in this run-down neighborhood.\(^{/}58\)

Although the use of drugs is best known as an urban phenomenon, in Palestine this habit was also discernable in rural areas, especially during religious holidays and commemorations. The annual festival (mawsim) at the village of Nabi Rubin (which was located, until its destruction in 1948, some 10 miles south of Jaffa) is a good example of this. Nabi Rubin is, according to Muslim tradition, the burial place of Reuben, son of prophet Ya‘qub, and his tomb became the principal pilgrimage site for the Muslim inhabitants of the central Coastal Plain. Commencing at the time of the August new moon and lasting a month, ‘the pilgrims would put up a tent city there accommodating 30,000 or more, in addition to temporary coffeehouses, restaurants and stalls selling food and other merchandise.’\(^{/}59\) A Jewish eyewitness to the 1934 festival returned with the following impressions:

Our host, a sailor with broad shoulders and a pleasant face, whose eyes radiated the wisdom of the experienced, greets us with the common calls of ‘Welcome’. This coastal man, whose livelihood depends on the sea and the port, arrives in [Nabi] Rubin ahead of time. He puts up a quadrangular and spacious tent, bringing the necessary tools for a bayt qahwa [coffee-house], from short stools… to long hookahs…. In a remote corner, hidden behind a screen, one may also find those intoxicating leaves which call for concealment. This is ‘the weed’ (hashish); each and every excruciating drag on which precipitates heart palpitations [and] grants its owner one of the sixty heavenly rewards promised to ‘believers’\(^{/}60\).

In spite of such occurrences, there is, however, every reason to believe that the number of hashish users in Palestine was not great — and, equally important, that even experienced consumers were not known to have abused the substance. You may recall that in their dispatches to London, the British authorities repeatedly stated that there was no real ‘dope problem’ in Palestine in terms of addiction and excessive consumption. In other words, although Palestine, being a ‘transit route’ in the regional drug trade, was entangled in various hashish smuggling operations, it did not give rise to an intensive and intricate hashish scene comparable to the one in Egypt, where it was said that hashish was ‘the source of numerous infections and diseases, and a refuge for the unemployed and the indolent, especially in those places noted for the consumption of hashish’.\(^{/}61\) However, as is usually the case with mind-altering substances, ‘proximity, and hence familiarity and availability, matters’\(^{/}62\). Hence, as one British police officer took care to point out, ‘during its transit through Palestine, a certain amount of hashish [was] placed on the local markets for home consumption’.\(^{/}63\)

An examination of the Palestinian public discourse of the period bears out the contention that consumption of hashish in Palestine was rather limited in scope. Unlike the situation in Egypt, where, as Liat Kozma has shown, the middle-classes (or effendiya) were
forcefully involved in anti-cannabis campaigns and vehemently debated hashish consumption in the press, in Palestine there is no evidence of a regular and systematic (Arab) middle-class preoccupation with the dangers of the use of hashish. On the contrary, although Palestine’s Arabic language press carried regular and reliable reports about the seizure of cannabis consignments and the arrest and prosecution of hashish smugglers, I have not found in them even a single instance of editorial concern or indignation at the phenomenon of hashish consumption, or its harm to Palestinian society. A more thorough research might uncover more references to the topic. However, this resounding silence perhaps demonstrates that representatives of the Palestinians and their middle class spokespersons — who, like their Egyptian counterparts studied by Kozma, believed in Western modernity and progress — did not consider hashish a burning problem that required unusual and immediate intervention.

Unlike the question of cannabis use among the Arab population in Mandatory Palestine — which may be worth further examination — it is abundantly clear that the Jews of Palestine, particularly those of the ‘New Yishuv’, tended to steer well clear of it. A partial answer as to why this was the case may be found in Zionism’s ethos of self-sufficiency and Hebrew labor, an ethos that put a premium on temperance rather than excess, and sobriety rather than intoxication. However, an additional reason, and one that bestowed on this ethos concrete and dramatic meanings, was colonial notions of hashish as a specifically Oriental (or Arab) substance, and one that inevitably leads its users to criminality, bestiality and murderous behavior à la medieval Assassins myth.

These notions were superimposed on prevailing racial/cultural assumptions in the Jewish community, in light of which Jews had established the Arabs’ otherness. The types of preexisting taken-for-granted convictions that allowed Jewish writers to authoritatively comment on the Arabs’ alleged failure to thrive — they indulge in a life of ‘ignorance’, ‘idleness and negligence’; they are ‘hotheaded’ and ‘easily susceptible to manipulation’; they respect ‘those who wield their fists’; they are ‘intense, stubborn, [and] very brutal’; and ‘the sword is the[eir] law’ — these same convictions also enabled them to create an association between the country’s Arabs and hashish consumption. Although Palestinian Arabs in fact appeared to have consumed very little cannabis, reading Hebrew texts from the period conveys the opposite impression.

A typical editorial published in the Hebrew-language newspaper Davar in the late 1930s is a case in point. The editorial begins by alleging that ‘drug culture’ in Palestine is, in the main, an ‘Oriental problem’: ‘Among the factors working in favor of the gangs operating in the country are Oriental intoxication or poisoning — carried on for generations and on a massive scale through Oriental drugs’. Hashish users, the editorial went on to say, ‘are easily given to boiling rage or homicide… with remarkable cold-heartedness’. Hashish ‘stuns’ the Arabs’ minds, ‘increases their suggestibility’, ‘weakens or destroys [their] recognition of reality’ and releases the ‘natural and social inhibitions’ without which there can be no cultural life to speak of. As a result, the Arab ‘becomes a man stripped of all drive or willpower’, and worse still, ‘a blind tool in the service of anyone seeking to manipulate him’. Bottom line: The Arabs’ attraction to hashish may account for their vicious, irrational, and unpredictable behavior ‘throughout history’.

Yitzhak Shami’s 1927 novella The Revenge of the Patriarchs encapsulates the three themes discussed so far in this section: the limited hashish consumption among...
Palestinian Arabs; the Jewish insistence, contrarily, to associate Arabs as hapless victims of this pernicious habit; and the close association between the Jewish repudiation of cannabis and Jewish repudiation of all things Arab. Inspired by a real incident, the novella, which is considered Shami’s most important work, begins with preparations for the annual spring festival of Nabi Musa, when processions of Muslim pilgrims from all over Palestine converge on the shrine (located some 25 miles east of Jerusalem). Three major groups travel from Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus — each with its own leader and flag-bearer, drummers and musicians, lancers and fencing champions. They come on horseback and on foot, men, women and children, with camels carrying provisions for several days.

We meet the novella’s tragic hero, leader of the Nablus group, Nimr Abu al-Shawarib (‘The Mustached One’), in the midst of the festival’s commotion and excitement. Tensions between Abu al-Shawarib and leader of the Hebron group, Abu Faris, are building up: repeatedly insulted by Abu Faris, Abu al-Shawarib is finally provoked into killing him. Fearing blood vengeance, he flees into the wilderness and ends up in Cairo a shadow of his former self. Shami’s ‘descriptions of the [Cairo] setting, the misery of exile and the power of remorse are incandescent’, as one reviewer of the novella observes. Indeed, during his Cairo sojourn Abu al-Shawarib unwisely spends the little money he had, becomes addicted to hashish, and suffers acute outbreaks of depression. As a result of seeing distressing visions, he decides to return to Palestine to seek the pardon of both Hebronites and the prophets buried in Hebron — Ibrahim, Ishaq and Ya’qub. Alas, as Abu al-Shawarib climbs down into the prophets’ burial cave, he is struck dead by the ‘vengeance of the Fathers’.

To the extent that hashish is concerned, the novella drives home two (explicit and implicit) messages: that hashish smokers are idle, lethargic, irrational, unproductive and violent; and that Oriental people, and Arabs in particular, are exceptionally predisposed to hashish inebriety. As mentioned, in Cairo al-Shawarib sinks ever deeper in despair, finding refuge in hashish:

[He] would rush to shut himself up in his room and inhale the amazing and intoxicating smoke, gulp after gulp. Hashish — more than all the amulets and charms given to him by hajjis and saintly dervishes — seemed to him to be a sure and effective means of relieving his pains, dulling his afflictions and subduing the endless moments of fear to twilight and slumber. And the more he took of this poisonous and malignant drug, the more impaired his health became, and the more his condition worsened.

As a result of his total surrender to hashish, Abu al-Shawarib not only turns violent — he yells, swears and gets involved in senseless brawls — his entire life becomes deplorable, pointless, and hopeless:

Nimr spent his life in idleness and waste, consumed by intoxication, debauchery and forgetfulness. Each day seemed like the day before, and each night like the night before. Coffee houses and music were his entire world, and hashish and cards his [only] joy and vision….

In sum, the pernicious effects produced by the use of hashish are such, that Abu al-Shawarib’s vitality and stamina equaled those of a lifeless being:

At nights his limbs and muscles were heavy as lead, but he could not shut his eyelids without multiplying his hashish dose. His friends… who often inquired to his health, would find him stretched out to full length, motionless, on the mat, his legs spread wide open, his caftan askew and rolled up underneath him, his hairy chest naked, his bleary eyes focusing on a rusty
tin oil lamp… gazing at it with no expression of life. His lower jaw was dangling and crooked just like a dead man’s.  

It is important to note here the interplay between Shami’s complex identity as a Hebrew writer and his approach to both Palestinian Arabs and hashish. On the one hand, Shami, who strove to become part of the Ashkenazi literary cannon of his time, was committed to a kind of prose that viewed Arabs as an enemy and a threat to the Zionist enterprise. It is for that reason that in the novella he describes the drive for murder and bloodshed as essential Arab traits, compares Arabs to both animals and insects, delves into the Arabs’ oppressive treatment of women and portrays Arabs as good-for-nothing hashish addicts.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the Hebron-born Shami was member of the old Sephardi Jewish community in Palestine, a community whose traditions and culture were similar to, and assimilated with, those of local Muslims and Christians. Hence, in the novella Shami ‘adopts the Arab point of view… [and] seeks to portray the Arabs from the inside, while penetrating deep into their world’. Because of this, he provides a credible account as possible of the hashish-smoking scene among Palestinian Arabs at the time. In fact, he actually ends up confirming what we already know, namely, that hashish consumption among Palestinian Arabs was a limited phenomenon. Consequently, Shami does not situate the centers of hashish use in Nablus or Hebron or Jerusalem or Jaffa, but in Cairo — ‘the promising and alluring city far away’.

Hashish consumption in Mandatory Palestine was most likely a limited affair. The Arabs of Palestine did smoke hashish, but not excessively, and the Jews of the country, who were the primary recipients of colonial knowledge about this substance, avoided it almost entirely. Inspired by this knowledge, Jewish commentaries tended to identify hashish consumption as the exclusive domain, and misfortune, of Oriental societies and, likewise, exaggerated the scale of the phenomenon among the Arab population in Palestine. At the same time, it was mainly Egypt, rather than Palestine, that these commentaries found to be ‘blighted by hashish’, citing this as proof of the substance’s supposedly Oriental-Arab and corrupting, debilitating nature.

To date, the twenty-first century has not been kind, so to speak, to Israel’s cannabis users, occasional consumers and full-fledged potheads alike. The al-Aqsa intifada at the turn of the century, followed by Israel’s ‘disengagement’ from the Gaza Strip (2005), the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the Israeli Army’s multiple attacks on Hamas-ruled Gaza (for example, the 2008 Operation Cast Lead, the 2012 Operation Pillar of Defense, and the 2014 Operation Protective Edge) — these crises not only wrought untold destruction in lives and infrastructure but also disrupted the trafficking of drugs into Israel, severely curtailing supply. The completion of the border fence along the Israeli-Egyptian border in 2012, which is intended to prevent the entry of refugees and labor migrants but also the smuggling of various illicit goods into the country, dealt another severe blow to Israelis’ access to their favorite psychoactive substances.

However, if there is any lesson to be drawn from the combat against the drug trade elsewhere in the world, past and present, it is that such supply droughts are not likely to last forever. Despite the closing of export routes, ‘the trade continues, constantly finding new outlets’; and ‘the greater the effort put into combating the trade... the greater the
efforts directed at evasion and at the continuation of one of the world’s three most profita-
table economies. Hence, despite the current supply crisis in Israel, Israeli potheads are
likely to find comfort in the fact that hashish traffickers have not been throwing up their
hands in the face of obstacles put in their way, as they continue looking for alternative
routes to have their illicit cargoes cross the border undetected and safely reach their desti-
nations inside Israeli territory, as before.

As we have seen, these cat-and-mouse games between cannabis smugglers and
enforcement authorities are hardly a new phenomenon in the territory now ruled by the
State of Israel. In fact, they are as old as the early post-Ottoman Middle East, dating back
to the beginning of the League of Nations Mandate states in the Levant. This latter land-
mark event coincided not only with the demarcation of boundaries between the new
Levant states but also with the formation of the first anti-cannabis prohibition regimes in
the world. Both of these encumbered the ability to transport psychoactive substances
safely and in relative ease, triggering what was destined to become an longstanding
rivalry between smugglers and the authorities, with each one trying to bamboozle the
other, and the former usually gaining the upper hand. Russell Pasha admitted as much.
Observing that in the struggle between hashish traffickers and the law, ‘every step in
improved technique by one side is quickly followed by still further improvement by the
other’, and that despite substantial sums of money spent on the prevention of hashish
smuggling, Palestine and Egypt have succeeded ‘in seizing perhaps some 10 per cent of
what enters’. As to hashish consumption in Israel, the habit is no longer considered an Arab problem
only. Since the 1960s cannabis use spread, like elsewhere in the world, to new social
groups of dramatically different socioeconomic-cum-ethnic profiles from those which had
previously been the case, with ‘marijuana [being] as common among West Bank settlers
as it is among Tel Aviv doctors and lawyers’. Still, continuities with the pre-1948 era can
be observed in the realm of anti-cannabis discourse. A blatant example of this is a short,
33-second video clip prepared by the Israel Anti-Drug Authority in 2006. Designed to dis-
suade teenagers from using intoxicating substances, particularly cannabis, and broadcast
on Israel’s main public television channel, the clip was produced in the style of the dilettante
‘last will and testament’ videos by Muslim suicide bombers. It shows a teenage boy
holding a bong (a hashish smoking device) as a deadly weapon, standing in front of an
unsteady camera, and reciting the following monologue:

I, Omer Kandel, aged sixteen of Raanana, bid my parents Ronit and Shmuel, and my sister
Keren goodbye, and am going to a party in Tel-Aviv. There’s only one way to be truly liberated:
to get drunk, take drugs, and get really stoned. Don’t cry, Mom. I’m going to paradise.

It is easy to see in this short clip echoes of the hashashin myth and the racialized con-
notations arising from it. At the time of the clip’s broadcast — the final days of the Second,
Al-Aqsa intifada and the height of the global War on Terror — the suicide bomber had, in
the United States, in Western Europe and in Israel, become emblematic of Islamic death
culture. The clip deliberately played on the strings of Islamophobia of the Israeli public
that was at a peak at that time. At the same time, it also drew upon the vocabulary of
nineteenth-century attitudes toward cannabis — namely, that hashish is an Oriental sub-
stance used by uncivilized Muslim zealots who champion a ritual of death rather than a rit-
ual of life.
Of equal note is the fact that the so-called ‘suicide bomber’ in the clip was a good middle-class Jewish boy from the ‘white’, well-to-do town of Raanana. In terms of his social background, demographic and ethnic identity, Omer represented something entirely different from the traditional image of hashish consumers in Israel, reflecting contemporary establishment’s concern lest hashish consumption would spread to all parts of Israeli society.

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Notes

4. Which is why in the 1920s, cannabis cultivation in the Lebanon increased enormously, reaching first an annual production of 1.5—2 tons, and later, from 1922 to 1925, 30—40 tons. Although in 1925 the cultivation of hashish was banned, the ban was never effectively enforced on the entire mandate territory, so that it was to reach an annual production of 50—60 tons by the end of the decade; L. Kozma, ‘Cannabis Prohibition in Egypt, 1880-1939: From Local Ban to League of Nations Diplomacy’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.47 (2011), p.453.
13. What is more, the Ottoman Empire kept up its opium trade to feed the consumption of the Europeans themselves (e.g. England and France) or of their colonial domains (e.g. French Indochina); P.A. Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), p.82.
18. For the present study, I have consulted the following archives: the National Archives (UK), the National Archives (US), the Israel State Archives, and the Hagana History Archives (Tel Aviv, Israel).
22. Ibid, p.194.
23. The names of hashish offenders in Palestine were provided each year in annual British reports on ‘important seizures of narcotic drugs’. The bulk of those arrested and/or indicted in hashish-related cases had distinct Arabic names.
32. Russell Pasha recalls how smugglers would glue ‘slabs of hashish’ underneath the ‘hair of the camels’ hump’, or otherwise force these slabs ‘down the[ir] throats’. Once crossing the border into Egypt the unfortunate creatures would then be ‘slaughtered... and the valuable cargo recovered’; Russell Pasha, *Egyptian Service*, pp.276–77. See also Broadhurst, *From Vine Street to Jerusalem*, pp.191–93.
33. ‘Hashish in the High Commissioner’s Train Car’, *Davar*, 1 July 1929. This was not an isolated event. A few days after this event, a similar incident occurred at the Jerusalem train station, where hashish was discovered in the car of a British official of the Palestine Railways. Here, too, the culprits were the ‘car’s workers’; see *Al-Karmil*, 12 July 1929.
34. See e.g. ‘Opium, hashish, a pistol and bullets discovered inside an automobile wheels’, *Davar*, 25 April 1937.
37. Details of this failed smuggling operation can be gleaned from ISA, P 9/195, ‘Henry Cattan — Smuggling of Hashish’.
39. For example, in 1933 the British Vice-Consulate at Constanta, Romania, reported the seizure of 400 kilos of hashish on board the SS *George Mabro*, a ship flying the Egyptian flag, which sailed to Alexandria via Haifa and Jaffa; and in the same year, the British in Constanta once again warned against ‘a consignment of drugs’ taken on board a Greek-owned ship, the S.S. *Danubian*, sailing from Constanta to Haifa and Jaffa, and from there to Alexandria; Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 141/764, Telegram to the High Commissioner for Egypt, 5 April 1933; and FO 141/764, H.G. Jakins, British Vice-Consulate, Constanta, 11 April 1933.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.

57. Mills, *Madness*; R. Keller, *Colonial Madness: Psychiatry in French North Africa* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). In the 1930s and 1940s American context, this premise explains, in part, why marijuana was deemed a ‘Killer Weed’ and why the mental state which it allegedly gave rise to was termed ‘Reefer Madness’.

58. ‘Smuggling Hashish and Opium through Haifa’, *Davar*, 3 May 1937. For similar expressions as regards hashish users in Jaffa, the largest city in Mandatory Palestine and the center of its cultural and economic life there, see *al-Karmil*, 6 April 1938.


64. Kozma, ‘Cannabis Prohibition’.


67. ‘The gangs in the country and hashish’, *Davar*, 20 March 1938.

68. Another *Davar* commentator mused in 1942: ‘These days, many of the Orientals are very keen on hashish. Over 200 million people — most of them Muslims — are accustomed to chewing, drinking, or smoking hashish... Some use hashish a great deal, and the intoxicating poison leads to deterioration and insanity’. See also Trevor Williams, ‘Hashish Menace a Thousand Years Old’, *Palestine Post*, Vol.18(Sep.), 1947.


75. Ibid, p.121.

76. Ibid, p.129.

77. Hever — in ‘Yitzhak Shami’, pp.124–139 — provides ample examples of these putative Arab traits in Shami’s literary works, and particularly in *The Vengeance of the Fathers*.


82. The Jordanian Arabic news website Al-Arab News has provided indications of this, reporting on April 13, 2014 (www.alarrabnews.com/newsView.php?id=61302), that drug smugglers have begun to shift their entry points into Israel to the Jordanian border, ‘due to the absence of a fence there, and because of the possibility of transferring [drugs] more easily from there than [around] the border with Egypt, where the security fence has been completed’.


